Dieser Band bietet ausser einer kritischen Edition des Textes der Ideen, der ersten naturphilosophischen Schrift Schellings, auch eine Fulle erklarender Anmerkungen mit Nachweisen von Zitaten und Anspielungen sowie Erlauterungen zu nicht mehr gebrauchlichen Begriffen und Bezeichnungen. Ein editorischer Bericht schildert die Entstehungsgeschichte der Ideen. In addition to a critical edition of the text of the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, Schellings first work on the philosophy of nature, this volume also provides an abundence of explanatory annotations with (...) evidence of quotations and allusions as well as explanations of terms which are no longer in use. An editorial report describes the history of the origins of the Ideas. (shrink)

The short cover-description of the present book tells that "Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) was one of the formative philosophers of German idealism, whose great service was in the areas of the philosophy of nature, art, and religion." Those having some familiarity with Schelling, and his influence on American philosophy, indirectly via Coleridge and Carlyle and more directly via Emerson and C. S. Peirce, will perhaps not be surprised to learn that German idealism itself looks somewhat different, understanding Schelling's differences (...) with Kant, Fichte, and Hegel; and while the work under review shows no awareness of the distant American influence of Schelling, or American developments in general (except perhaps in some citations of Arthur Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being), I will take the present opportunity to emphasize connections and possible connections to American philosophy, as allowed by the author's account of Schelling and some further citations. (shrink)

This book explores how and when biology emerged as a science in Germany. Beginning with the debate about organism between Georg Ernst Stahl and Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteenth century, John Zammito traces the development of a new research program, culminating in 1800, in the formulation of developmental morphology. He shows how over the course of the century, naturalists undertook to transform some domains of natural history into a distinct branch of natural philosophy, which attempted not only (...) to describe but to explain the natural world and became, ultimately, the science of biology. (shrink)

The mind-body relation or, more particularly, the mind-brain relation 1 has been a perennial puzzle for philosophers—how can things so different be intimately related? Husserl dealt with the mind-brain relation in Section 63 of Ideen II, “Psychophysischer Parallelismus and Wechselwirkung,” 2 where he gave a critique of psychophysical parallelism. For Husserl, the mind-brain relation is to be understood not as a material or metaphysical relation, but as a relation between the presented sense or significance of two varieties of appearances. (...) Husserl’s account in this section will be examined and the following points will be discussed: (1) Husserl’s argument that the significance of brain states is basic to the full sense of a mind operating in an objective world; (2) Husserl’s view that a strict parallelism between the psyche and brain is an eidetic impossibility; (3) Husserl’s treatment of these questions, in so far as he raises but does not adequately resolve the issue, whether states of consciousness precede or follow brain states; (4) Husserl’s somewhat Cartesian failure to distinguish the phenomenological priority of consciousness from the metaphysical question of the possibility of an existent mind apart from a body. (shrink)

The first part of this essay was read at a Symposium on “Hegel and Schelling” at the Conference of the Canadian Philosophical Association at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba in June 1985. The text was then discussed as a whole by George di Giovanni and Michael Vater. Since their commentaries are here published with it, I have allowed the mistakes which they identified to remain clearly visible. The few revisions of substance that I have made are clearly indicated in (...) the footnotes; and the justification of my final position is given in this Postscript. (shrink)

_In this essay, Hegel attempted to show how Fichte’s Science of Knowledge was an advance from the position of Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, and how Schelling had made a further advance from the position of Fichte._.

As the title indicates, Faith and Knowledge deals with the relation between religious faith and cognitive beliefs, between the truth of religion and the truths of philosophy and science. Hegel is guided by his understanding of the historical situation: the individual alienated from God, nature, and community; and he is influenced by the new philosophy of Schelling, the Spinozistic Philosophy of Identity with its superb vision of the inner unity of God, nature, and rational man. Through a brilliant discussion of (...) the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and other luminaries of the period, Hegel shows that the time has finally come to give philosophy the authentic shape it has always been trying to reach, a shape in which philosophy’s old conflicts with religion on the one hand and with the sciences on the other are suspended once for all. This is the first English translation of this important essay. Professor H. S. Harris offers a historical and analytic commentary to the text and Professor Cerf offers an introduction to the general reader which focuses on the concept of intellectual intuition and on the difference between authentic and inauthentic philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.1 (2002) 125-142 [Access article in PDF] Hölderlin's Poetic Self-consciousness James H. Donelan Nur ihren Gesang sollt' ich vergessen, nur diese Seelentöne sollten nimmer wiederkehren in meinen unaufhörlichen Träumen. I should forget only her song, only these notes of the soul should never return in my unending dreams. Hölderlin, Hyperion I FOR MANY YEARS, Friedrich Hölderlin has occupied a crucial position in both literary and philosophical (...) history. Well-known literary theorists, such as Walter Benjamin, Peter Szondi, and Paul de Man, have described him as the poet who made the transition from German Classicism to Romanticism. Several major philosophers, including Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank, claim that Hölderlin's insights into Kantian and Fichtean metaphysics were vital to Schelling's and Hegel's far more famous accounts of subjectivity. Either contribution alone would make Hölderlin an important figure in intellectual history; it is almost miraculous that he managed both, especially when one considers the brevity of his career, a span of only ten or twelve productive years.What accounts for this remarkable dual achievement? Historical accident and tremendous talent give us only a partial answer. Hölderlin was fortunate to have Hegel and Schelling as close friends at the Tübinger Stift, and to move to Jena precisely when it had become a center for new thinking in both literary and philosophical circles. He had enormous ability both for ancient Greek and poetic meter, allowing him to benefit from his predecessors and his contemporaries [End Page 125] in remarkable ways. However, his parallel accomplishments in philosophy and poetry are linked by more than just happenstance and genius. In my view, they represent the continuous development of a solution to a single problem, that of self-consciousness, realized in poetic form through an idea of music. For Hölderlin, making the transition from philosopher to poet required him to establish a connection between Idealist theories of self-consciousness and the material world. To meet this challenge, he constituted himself as a self-conscious poet through both theoretical and actual poetic creations, and constituted a musical-poetic voice, or Gesang, within his poetry as a means of joining the abstractions of philosophy with the concrete voice of the poet.The background of this transformation lies in the complex history of the idea of self-consciousness, or subjectivity. In the early Idealist accounts of self-consciousness of Kant and Fichte, the subject recognizes its existence by juxtaposing itself with an object. However, the nature of this object, and the connection between the abstract, theoretical construction of the subject and the actual, practical experience of the conscious self posed a problem that neither philosopher solved definitively. For Kant, self-consciousness emerges from a pre-reflective sense of the self's existence as the subject of different experiences of phenomena over time; self-consciousness therefore arises from a deduction of empirical experience. However, this formulation contains a surprisingly belated and unmotivated version of the self, with no clear account of its origin.Fichte answered the question about the origin of the self by stating that the self posits itself through its opposition to a material object, a non-self he calls the Nicht-ich, and becomes self-conscious by differentiating the Ich from the Nicht-ich and declaring "I am I." Fichte's explanation of self-consciousness as an act rather than an entity nevertheless relies on a kind of solipsism and still does not sufficiently address the ultimate cause of the process. The Ich that declares its own existence must distinguish itself from the Nicht-ich somehow; the relation between the two terms presupposes a subject that already possesses sensory apprehension to create the distinction between Ich and Nicht-ich necessary for the initial positing of the self.Either explicitly or implicitly, both Kant's and Fichte's versions of subjectivity rely on the category of the aesthetic, defined as the experience of precognitive sensation in general, to mediate the encounter between subject and object. Kant later expanded his inquiry [End Page 126] into... (shrink)

_In this essay, Hegel attempted to show how Fichte’s Science of Knowledge was an advance from the position of Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, and how Schelling had made a further advance from the position of Fichte._.

Cette étude critique deux notions très répandues: 1° que les genes chromosomes forment les unités fondamentales du mécanisme biologique: 2° que les organismes sont des conséquences d'ensembles de genes ‘libres’.Il est suggéré que 3° l'information codée dans les chromosomes est plutôt comparable aux indications données par un livret d'instructions et que 4° des actions fondamentales des cellules ont pu précéder les instructions qui les concernent de même façon que les techniques humaines ont précédé des textes qui les analysent.Cette analogie est (...) élaborée en certains détails et quelquesunes de ses limitations sont demonstrées.In this paper two widely held ideas are criticized: that chromosomal genes are the fundamental units of biological machinery and that organisms have arisen from assemblies of “free” genes.Instead it is suggested that the information encoded in the chromosomes may better be compared with the instructions contained in a textbook or leaflet, an that basic cell activities may have preceded the instructions dealing with them in the same way in which human skills have preceded any texts dealing with them.This analogy is elaborated in certain details and some of its limitations are shown.Die Arbeit ist eine Kritik zweier weitverbreiteter Ideen, nämlich dass die Gene in den Chromosomen die fundamentalen Bestandteile der biologischen Maschinerie sind und dass die Organismen von Aggregaten „freier“ Gene abstammen.Statt dessen wird vorgeschlagen, dass die in den Chromosomen kodifizierte Information eher mit den Instruktionen eines Lehrbuchs oder einer Gebrauchsanweisung vergleichbar ist und dass die grundlegenden Zellaktivitäten früheren Ursprungs sein dürften, als die Instruktionen zu ihrer Ausführung, etwa in der Weise in der menschliche Fertigkeiten gedruckten Anweisungen zu ihrer Ausführung vorausgegangen sind.Verschiedene Einzelheiten dieser Analogie werden verfolgt und einige ihrer Grenzen aufgezeigt. (shrink)

A work that "not only treats of irony but is irony," wrote a contemporary reviewer of The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates. Presented here with Kierkegaard's notes of the celebrated Berlin lectures on "positive philosophy" by F.W.J. Schelling, the book is a seedbed of Kierkegaard's subsequent work, both stylistically and thematically. Part One concentrates on Socrates, the master ironist, as interpreted by Xenophon, Plato, and Aristophanes, with a word on Hegel and Hegelian categories. Part Two is a (...) more synoptic discussion of the concept of irony in Kierkegaard's categories, with examples from other philosophers and with particular attention given to A. W. Schlegel's novel Lucinde as an epitome of romantic irony.The Concept of Irony and the Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures belong to the momentous year 1841, which included not only the completion of Kierkegaard's university work and his sojourn in Berlin, but also the end of his engagement to Regine Olsen and the initial writing of Either/Or. (shrink)

This volume starts where the four-volume work by Johannes Hoffmeister, Briefe von und an Hegel, left off. It consists of excerpts from letters, diaries, memoirs, newspaper and journal articles, etc., much of which has never been published before. What emerges is a conflicting picture of Hegel, the man--from which the reader can take his choice. The comments are from contemporaries: relatives, friends, acquaintances, students, colleagues, admirers, critics, and last, but not least, enemies. The chapters are organized chronologically by city of (...) residence, beginning with Stuttgart, 1770-1788, and covering the periods in Tübingen, Bern, Frankfurt, Jena, Bamberg, Nürnberg, Heidelberg, and Berlin. There is a special chapter on the period immediately following Hegel's death, and a final chapter on After-Effects. The biggest chapter by far is the one on the Berlin period, which spans the longest space of time and also covers the time when Hegel's fame had reached its zenith. All told there are 769 excerpts from the pens of such varied personalities as Karl, Christiane, and Marie Hegel, Hölderlin, Goethe, Schelling, Karl Rosenkranz, Eduard Zeller, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schiller, Schlegel, Brentano, Savigny, Michelet, Schopenhauer, Victor Cousin, Heine, Feuerbach, Bouterwek, Varnhagen v. Ense, K. F. Zeller, Arnold Ruge, Ranke, Eduard Gans, and many others. This book will undoubtedly figure prominently in future biographies of Hegel. However, it is not only for the Hegel specialist. Those who are interested in that specific period of German culture and those who simply enjoy anecdotal historical commentary will find much of interest and amusement here.--H. B. (shrink)

The scope and length of this anthology make it one of the best recent introductions to Continental thought for the English-speaking reader. Despite the editor's efforts to compass a century and a half of European thought under the somewhat inflated title of a "search for being," each of the fourteen contributors is allowed enough space to show that no single problem or quest concretely typifies European philosophical activity in our time. If one overlooks the dramatic cutting and pasting required by (...) the attempt to give an existential flavor to the thinkers, one finds the merit of the book to be precisely the inclusion of authors whose interests are in important respects quite divergent from those of the existentialists. There are new, long translations from Schelling, Ravaisson, Lachelier, Simmel, Husserl, and Heidegger. There is a selected bibliography.--W. H. C. (shrink)

Die Philosophie Karl Leonhard Reinholds (1757-1823) findet heute vermehrt Beachtung. Während dieser Denker lange Zeit als Popularisator Kants, als Vorläufer Fichtes oder als tatsachenphilosophischer Antipode Schellings und Hegels wahrgenommen wurde und gemeinhin im Ruf eines unsteten und unselbständigen Geistes stand, ist seit einigen Jahrzehnten eine Gegentendenz feststellbar: Reinholds Denkentfaltung wird zunehmend in ihrem gesamten Umfang sowie als eigenwilliger und innovativer Ansatz innerhalb der postkantischen Systemphilosophie zur Kenntnis genommen. Mehr und mehr wird anerkannt, dass Reinhold entscheidende Anstöße zur Entstehung des deutschen (...) Idealismus gegeben und diese Strömung zugleich auf der Grundlage von Einsichten, die in die Richtung der Phänomenologie und Sprachphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts weisen, kritisiert hat. Die in diesem Band vereinigten Beiträge gehen auf die I. Internationale Reinhold-Tagung zurück, die vom 14. bis 18. März 1998 in Bad Homburg stattgefunden hat. Sie geben systematische Fragestellungen und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Kontexte aus Reinholds kantischer Phase der Elementarphilosophie, aus der Periode seiner Zusammenarbeit mit Fichte und Jacobi sowie aus seiner sprachphilosophisch orientierten Spätzeit wieder. Alles in allem spiegeln sie das gegenwärtige Bedürfnis, Reinhold zu entdecken, sein Denken und Schaffen in seinen Wandlungen und in seiner thematischen Breite aufzuarbeiten und nachzuvollziehen. Zudem sind sie repräsentativ für die aktuell bestehenden vielfältigen Zugänge zu diesem produktiven Philosophen. (shrink)

Peirce thought of himself as an “objective idealist;” and in 1892 he called his philosophy a “Schelling-fashioned idealism.” But this claim of his is one of several fundamental assertions that he made about his work which has not been well or widely understood. The prevailing attitude of the Pragmatists as a school, toward speculative idealism, was set by Dewey, for whom pragmatism was an escape route. So, although Peirce’s position in the great medieval battle about the reality of universals has (...) been studied and appreciated, the work done on his relation to German idealism still tends to place him in the critical tradition of Kant and his own father, rather than in the speculative tradition of Schelling’s Identity Theory and of Hegel’s Logic. (shrink)

T. 1. Zusammenhänge, Ideen, Erkenntnisse.

The dialogue Bruno, which Schelling published in 1802, has always been recognized as one of the minor masterpieces of German Romantic literature. It cannot be ranked with Hölderlin’s Hyperion or with the Heinrich von Ofterdingen of Novalis; but it is one of the relatively few works by a major German philosopher that deserves the serious attention of general readers of European literature. Unlike Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, Schelling could write about the most abstruse philosophical issues in a way that was (...) intelligible and interesting to the cultured general audience of the time. In this respect he is the only German before Schopenhauer and Nietzsche who can be compared with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume — though it is only with the Berkeley of Alciphron and Siris that his thought has any affinities! (shrink)

This chapter will be devoted to the itinerary of classical German thought, and especially Hegel, in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. I begin by examining Merleau-Ponty’s initial use of Hegel’s systematic and metaphysicalmetaphysics ideas in phenomenological analyses of behavior and perception. Next, I examine Merleau-Ponty’s role in controversies regarding the existentialists’ interpretation and objections to Hegel’s system. I trace his attempts to surmount antinomiesantinomy between subjectivitysubjectivity and system that emerged in the existentialist’s anthropological reading of Hegel. Here Merleau-Ponty focused on linguistics and more (...) general analyses of institution and expression. Finally, I will view the renewed role that classical German philosophy, including Schelling and Hegel, played in his final works. Still reflecting these interests, his writings and lectures engaged in a wide-ranging dialogue with contemporary aesthetics, sciencescience, and philosophy, culminating in an attempt to formulate a new ontologyontology. (shrink)

The beginnings of Hegel’s interest in “logic” as a branch of philosophy are somewhat obscure. In a lecture of 1830 Schelling claimed that Hegel first began to attend to the subject only because “his friends at the University” suggested that it was a good topic for his lectures because it was being neglected. Schelling’s object by then was evidently to suggest that Hegel’s “logic” had always been a superficial pretense. But Hegel was alive to contradict him. So I think his (...) statement of the facts must be right as far as it goes. I do not therefore believe that Hegel came to Jena with any “logical” manuscripts. In my view, it was Schelling himself—especially in his System of Transcendental Idealism —who sparked Hegel’s interest in the subject. (shrink)

Der Autor zeichnet die verschiedenen Auffassungen der Entstehung der Psyche in den Arbeiten von fünf psychoanalytischen Theoretikern nach, die er als zentral für die Entwicklung einer neuen und fruchtbaren Form des psychoanalytischen Denkens und der Psychoanalyse ansieht: Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott und Bion. Die Konzeption des Selbst, die von jedem dieser Autoren vorgestellt wird, wandelt sich von der eines psychischen Apparats (bei Freud, Klein und Fairbairn) zu der eines Prozesses, der im Akt des Erlebens selbst angesiedelt ist (bei Winnicott und (...) Bion). Die Arbeit eines jeden dieser Theoretiker stellt im Vergleich zu den Vorgängern und Nachfolgern jeweils eine radikale Transformation des Denkens dar. Indem der Autor die »Geschichten« der Entstehung und des Konzepts der Psyche erzählt, die jeder dieser Theoretiker entwirft, stellt er nicht nur seine eigene narrative Struktur und Erläuterungen ihrer Arbeit vor, sondern auch seine eigenen Interpretationen und Erweiterungen ihrer Ideen. (shrink)

This fairly massive volume, clearly written and admirably printed and presented, deals with just one major crisis in the development of Hegel’s thought. It begins with the two-year collaboration of Schelling and Hegel at Jena from the spring of 1801 till the spring of 1803; and it terminates with the text book that Hegel abandoned unfinished in the spring of 1805. In two important respects it does not adequately cover “Hegel’s itinerary at Jena”. First, it does not deal with the (...) second crisis - the one that caused Hegel to abandon his textbook unfinished, and begin working on the Phenomenology, while recasting the presentation of his “real philosophy” in the logical mould which he essentially retained after the end of 1805,. Secondly, it does not deal with the evolution of Hegel’s philosophy of nature at all. The author is interested exclusively in the interrelation and interaction between Hegel’s conception of logic and philosophic method and his social philosophy. (shrink)